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Interstate Rendition:
Rights and Remedies of the Accused
Seeking Asylum in Massachusetts
By
GENE R. SHREVE*
The subject of Interstate Rendition is one of conspicuous unfanili-
arity to the average Massachusetts lawyer. Yet, as this article indicates,
the rendition hearing presents a valuable opportunity to alert defense
counsel to assist the accused at a critical stage of the criminal proceed-
ing. The author, a graduate of Harvard Law School is presently law
clerk to United States District Judge Sara/h T. Hughes of the Northern
District of Texas. He formerly served as Massachusetts Assistant
Attorney General where he presided at numerous rendition hearings
conducted by the Department of the Attornel, General for the
(overnor.
Each year several hundred persons in Massachusetts find them-
selves the subjects of out-of-state criminal rendition demands. Mem-
bers of the bar advising and defending in these cases for the first
time must necessarily approach a body of rules and procedures
which lay outside the ordinary scope of criminal process. Conse-
quently, essential knowledge and appreciation of the successive steps
of the rendition process often eludes the defense lawyer. The ob-
ject of this article is to enhance the lawyer's understanding of his
client's situation as an alleged fugitive from justice and of the steps
which might be taken to block his return.
The First Arrest
The process leading to the original arrest of the accused begins
when local Massachusetts police authorities receive word from the
demanding state that a warrant is currently outstanding against the
accused in the demanding jurisdiction. A police officer then appears
before the local district court and on his own oath or on the strength
of an out-of-state complaint obtains a fugitive arrest warrant.' Iocal
authorities may, where the out-of-state offense is punishable "by
death or by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," arrest
the accused without a fugitive warrant, subject to the procedure
of § 20B.
The accused is arraigned in district court. After being advised
of his right to counsel, the accused is asked if he wishes to waive
rendition proceedings pursuant to § 20.1. If he refuses, the local
authorities will subsequently notify the law enforcement officials of
*The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the policies
of the Governor or the Department of the Attorney General.
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the demanding state. The prosecutorial officer of the demanding
state, usually a district attorney, will begin preparing the rendition
iequest papers for the Governor of Massachusetts.
Meanwhile. under § 20(, the subject may be placed in custody
for an initial period not to exceed thirty days to allow an oppor-
tuniity fbr the rendition papers to be prepared and acted upon by
the (;overnor of Massachusetts. Under § 201'. this period may be
extended for an additional sixty days.
Unless the offense the subject has allegedly cotiniitted in the
demanding jurisdiction is punishable in that jurisdiction by death
or life imprisonment, the subject may he admitted to bail tinder
§ 20D.
The Attorney General's Hearing
A short tiie after the arrest of the acctised, tile ( vcrmn (I
Massachi setts receives rendition papers on the slbject acnplanied
by a covering reqiiiest certificate froni the Governor of the demand-
ing state. The Governor of Massachusetts must then decide whether
tc issue a warrant of arrest described in §§ 16 and 17. In the ab-
sence of a stuccessful petition for habeas corpus under § 19. this
%votild resuilt in the surrender of custody of the accused to authori-
ties of lhe demanding state who would appear in Massachusetts puir-
stiant to .§ 12 and 13.
Before his warrant can validly issue, the Govertior must deter-
mine to his satisfaction that the rendition papers substantially
charge the accused with a crime in the demanding jurisdiction and
are otherwise valid as to authentication and formni. The Governor
iutist also determine that the accused is in fact a fugitive from
justice. 2
The Governor has by § 15 the prerogative of calling upon the
Attorney General to investigate the facts of each rendition request
and advise upon the validity of the papers. Out of this practice has
evolved the fixed procedure of an investigative hearing conducted
by a member of the Attorney General's legal staff.
These hearings are relatively informal. Often only the staff
attorney, his secretary, the accused, and his counsel are present. No
oaths are administered. Usually no stenographic record is taken
and the Governor is not obliged to follow the recommendations of
the hearing examiner which subsequently appear in the hearing
report. " Hence, defense counsel often do not take the hearing
seriously. This is most unfortunate because it is at the stage of the
Attorney General's hearing that an accused subjected to the process
of rendition most often has an opportunity to block his return. For
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this reason it may be worth examining in detail some misconceptions
commonly reflected by counsel concerning the nature and potential
usefulness of the hearing.
Defense counsel often consider the Attorney (;eneral's hearing
to be a mere formality required by law. On the contrary, the hear-
ing is held at the discretion of' the Governor and could conceivably
be dispensed with altogether without rendering a resulting gover-
nor's arrest warrant defective. 4 At all events, in practice, the hear-
ing is the principal source of information upon which the Gov-
ernor will base his decision.
Defense counsel often erroneously believe that the hearing ex-
aminer is fulfilling a prosecutorial role. This feeling is no doubt
based on defense counsel's awareness of the standard prosecutorial
duties of the Attorney General's legal staff and by the absence of
any prosecutorial officials from the demanding state at the hearing.
In fact, the purpose of the hearing is to uincover any weaknesses
which may exist in the request of the demanding state. The alleged
fugitive has much to gain and little to lose by vigorously pursuing
his arguments at this stage.
A third error of judgment often made by the defense counsel.
one related to the two already discussed, is the pervasive feeling
that no great amount of preparation of the accused's case is neces-
sary until after the Governor of Massachusetts has issued an arrest
warrant and the Superior Court hears a petition for habeas corpus
pursuant to § 19. Steps which counsel should take at a habeas
corpus proceeding will be the subject of the following section. It is
sufficient to note here that the powers of the Governor to grant
relief to the accused by not honoring the request of the demanding
state are far broader than are the powers of the court to void the
Governor's warrant of arrest once he has decided to comply with
the demand.
The hearing is usually brief. It is conducted around four ques-
tions asked by the examiner. The examiner asks the accused
through his attorney: first, if he is the person identified in the de-
manding papers; second, if he was present in the demanding state
at the time the alleged crime occurred; third, if he has any objec-
tion to the legal form of the documents; and, fourth, if he has any
statement to make which is in any way a plea to the Governor.
The first of these questions is designed to uncover cases of mis-
taken identity. The second assists the Governor in determining
whether the accused is a fugitive from justice (a discussion of what
facts must be present before the accused can be found to be a fugi-
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tive from justice appears in the following section). The third ques-
tion concerns the legal criteria of form and authentication for the
demand papers set out in § 14.1 The fourth and final question is
frequently the most important. It provides the accused with an op-
portunity to offer any reasons why he believes his presence in Mas-
sachusetts should not be terminated.
The response given to the last question is probably more in--
strumental in the Governor's periodic decision not to act on a ren-
dition demand than the responses given to any ofthe other three'
Although federal law clearly states that the executive authority of
the asylum state -shall" turn custody of the accused over to aithori-
ties of the demanding state if legal requirements are met. 18 U.S.
C.A. 3182 (1951), the Governor of each state will periodically re-
fuse to act upon an interstate rendition demand when he concludes
that honoring the request would produce a harsh or inequitable
result upon the accused or others in the asylum state. In so acting,
state governors are beyond the reach of federal courts.'; Fach go\-
enor remains aware, however, that his own rendition demands are
being considered by governors of other states and that, in the gen-
eral interest of law enforcement, most valid requests must be
honored.
In responding to the four questions discussed above, counsel
for the accused may support his arguments with written evidence
or the testimony of witnesses. The hearing examiner ordinarily
prepares his report immediately after the hearing, but he may post-
pone preparation of the report for a reasonable period of time to
receive further evidence.
Relief by Habeas Corpus
If the Governor does decide to issue his warrant of arrest, the
accused is entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus described
in § 19. In Massachusetts the proceeding is used to attack the Gov-
ernor's warrant of arrest on three grounds.
First, the petitioner may argue that he is not the person identi-
fied in the Governor's warrant of arrest. While the question is or-
dinarily framed so as to allege a mistake of identity in the Gover-
nor's warrant, the underlying issue becomes one of the identity of
the person referred to as the fugitive in the papers of the demand-
ing state.7
Second, the petitioner can argue that the demand papers do
not meet the standards set forth in § 14.8
Third, the petitioner may argue that lie is not a "Fugiive froom
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iustice." To be a fugitive front justice, the accused must have been
in the demanding state at the time the crinie was alleged to have
been committed. He must also have been charged with a crime in
the denianding state and have left its jurisdiction.1' Two of the re-
quirenients above have been broadened by § 13. The accused may
be sul)ject to surrender by the (;overnor to the demanding state
even though he was not present in the demanding state when the
crine was committed if he committed acts in another state inten-
tionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state. Section 13 also
permits the Governor to surrender the accused even though he left
the demanding state involuntarily.
While the cases in Massachusetts are not entirely clear, the
standards of proof necessary for the petitioner to prevail in each of
the three arguments discussed in this section appear to vary greatly.
Relative to the question of the identity of the person named in
the Governor's warrant of arrest, in Baker, petitioner, the Supreme
Judicial Court stated:
"We . . . assume, in favor of the petitioner, that the point
he intended to raise . . . was that the burden of proving
that the petitioner was the person charged with the crime
and was the one intended to be extradited to New Hamp-
shire for trial of the offense of which he was accused is
upon the respondent. The identity of the petitioner with
the person named in the rendition warrant is open upon
a petition for habeas corpus." Supra at pg. 730.
One construction of this language wotild mean that the peti-
tioner, by merely denying his identity to be that of the person men-
tioned in the papers, puts the burden of proving the question on
the respondent.
This rule of proof contrasts with the general rule applicable
to the question whether the standards of form and authentication
of § 14 have been met. First laid down in Davis's Case,' 0 and sub-
sequently quoted in a number of Supreme Judicial Court opinions.
the most recent of which was Murphy, peoilionter, the rule states
that the Governor's warrant of arrest
"... is prima facie evidence, at least, that all necessary legal
prerequisites have been complied with, and, if the previous
proceedings appear to be regular, is conclusive evidence of
the right to remove the prisoner to the state from which
he fled." Supra, at p. 211.
When the petitioner argues that he is not a fugitive from jus-
tice, he encounters even greater problems of proof. While the two
arguments previously discussed present questions of law readily
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open to judicial inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding, whether
the petitioner is a fugitive from justice is a question of lac, initally
decided by the Governor. 1 The Supreme Judicial Court iii .lurphy.
petitioner, supra, observed that "whether the petitioners were fugi-
tives from justice was a question of fact for the Governor I() deter-
mine upon evidence satisfactory to him."'-'
In Massachusetts the standard of proof necessary for the peti-
tioner to upset the Governor's decision that the petitioner is a figi-
tive from justice is very difficult to meet. Quoting the United States
Supremne Court opinion, McNichols v. Pease,13 Chief Justice Rugg
in Gerinain, petitioner, stated: supra, at pp. 295-296,
"When a person is held in custody as a fugitive from Justice
under an extradition warrant, in proper form, and showing
upon its face all that is required by law to be shown as a
prerequisite to its being issued, he should not be dis-
charged from custody unless it is made clearly and satis-
factorily to appear that he is not a fugitive from justice
within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the
United States."
Massachusetts cases shed light on what the petitioner must do
to "clearly and satisfactorily" prove lie is not a ftugitive I rom jus-
tice by negative implication. The Supreme Judicial Court in Mur-
phy, petiioler, supra, quoted the language of Almunsen v. ('lough, 4
the court will not discharge a defendant arrested under
the governor's warrant where there is merely contradictory
evidence on the subject of presence in or absence from the
state, as habeas corpus is not the proper proceeding to try
the question of alibi, or any question as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused." (See also Baker, petitioner,
.supra, at pp. 732-733. Germain, petitioner, supra, at pp.
296-297; and G.L. c. 276, § 20H.) supra, at p. 210.
Supreme Judicial Court opinions reveal that, when the peti-
tioner challenges his status as a fugitive from justice, it is usually
on the ground that he was not present in the demanding state at
the time the crime was allegedly committed. This is doubtless be-
cause the question whether the petitioner has been substantially
charged with a crime can be more easily raised within the context
of § 14.
There is another argument which, though untested in the Su-
preme judicial Court, appears fully applicable in a habeas corpus
proceeding under § 19. This is the challenge that the arrest on the
Governor's warrant was without probable cause. "There is no rea-
son why the Fourth Amendment, which governs arrests, should not
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govern extradition arrests." Kirkland v. Preslon.t ' Kirklatd stated
that unless the demand is accompanied by an indictment, which
"embodies a grand jury's judgment that constitutional prol)al)le
cause exists . there is no assurance of probable cause unless it
is spelled out in the affidavit itself.""'
FOOTNOTES
S(;.l.. c. 276 § 20A.
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" Apple'vard v. Massachusetts, 203 IJ.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122. 51 LEd. 161 (1906);
Ex parte (;ermain, 258 Mass. 289, 155 N.E. 12, 51 A.L.R. 789 (1927); see "Rights of
the Accused in Interstate Rendition of Fugitives", 41 Harv. .. Rev. 74, 75 (1927).
, In re Murphy, 321 Mass. 206. 209, 72 N.F.2d 413 (1947).
4 See the analysis of justice Wilkins in In re Murplv. sula, at pp. 208-209.
For a discussion If questions ,,f fotrt anid alhentlicalion. see Murphy, petitionor.
supra, at pp. 211-214. and the authorities cited therein.
tlEx parle Kentuck v . Dennison, 24 How. 66. 16 LEd. 717 (1961).
7See, e.q., Baker, /;etitioner, supra, at pp. 730-731.
8 See Murphy. Petitioner. sultra: and In re Baker, 310 Mass. 724. 39 N.F.2d 762
(1942), cert. den. 316 U.S. 699, 62 S Ct. 1297. 86 T..Ed. 1768.
"In re Kingshun, 106 Mass. 223 (1870). Cf. Pearsen v. Campbell. 97 N.H. -144,
91 A.2d 562.
10 122 Mass. 324, 328 (1877).
11 See the analysis of Chief Justice Rngg in Cermain, petitioner, supra, at pp.
291-296.
12.S Su a at pff. 9'1
13207 US. 100. 112. 28 S.Ct. 58. 52 L.Ed. 121 (1907).
14 196 11.S 364. 375. 25 S.Ct. 282. 49 LEd. 515 (1905).
.385 F.2d 670. 676 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
1 (Snupra, at p. 676). On the general subject of probable catse in stale arrest,
see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.E.d2d 142 (1964).
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